Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security
In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear programme offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.
Rajesh M. BASRUR is Director of the Centre of Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He was a Visiting Fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Studies in Asian Security
Publication Year: 2009
264 pages, 229mm x 152mm
ISBN: 978-9971-69-444-9, Paperback
NUS Press and Stanford University Press